Essays on Infinite Lifespans
Russell Blackford
263
before we were even conceived (p8). [3] This assumes that
each of us is the biologically organized matter continuous
with a particular zygote, created at a particular point in time.
Kaufman takes a different approach. He argues that even if
the self, as a “metaphysical entity” (p309), [5] is defined in
this way, the real problem for Lucretius is that events in my
past affect my current personality. If I had been alive at the
time of the Carthaginian wars, I would not now be as I now
am, thinking the thoughts that I do and having the wishes
that I have! That being so, Kaufman says, I cannot coherently
regret not having been alive earlier, for I would be wishing
away my own personality (307–311). [5]
In my view, these arguments are not at all decisive against the
position of Lucretius. The short answer to Kaufman is that his
approach proves too much. Many events whose occurrence
we later regret influence the development of our personalities.
Indeed, Kaufman’s argument appears to rule out the appro-
priateness of regret in those cases where it actually seems to
be most appropriate, such as when someone’s personality has
changed deeply over the years as a result of dwelling upon a
crime, or some non-criminal but seriously hurtful act, that she
once committed.
The argument put by Nagel is both more difficult and more
convincing. In the end, however, it appears to fail. Assume for
the sake of argument that ‘I’ am a biologically organized four-
dimensional being whose earliest temporal stage is the zygote
that was formed when one of my father’s sperm cells fertilized
one of my mother’s ova. It seems that I could not simultane-
ously have an identity defined in such a way and have had
experiences before I was even conceived.
At the same time, we can imagine logically possible sce-
narios in which the very same zygote could have come
into existence at an earlier time than it did. Imagine that
a certain person was born twenty years after a particular